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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum surveys the principles governing the use of duress as a defence in
international criminal law. Examination of the existing precedent regarding this issue indicates
that no clear rule has yet been formed in customary international law. Thus, this memorandum
will look to the precedent established both during the post-World War II military tribunals and in
trials presented before International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY]. It will
also present an analysis of duress as provided for as a defence in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. There is no customary international law determination on the issue of
duress as a defence.
National common law jurisdictions and civil law jurisdictions differ on the application of
duress as a defence. In general, common law jurisdictions – with the exception of some U.S.
jurisdictions – disallow duress as a complete defence, though the presence of duress may be used
as a factor in mitigation of sentencing. Civil law jurisdictions are divided in the application of
duress as a defence to murder charges; some civil law jurisdictions consider duress to be a
defence to all crimes whereas others deny duress as a defence to murder.
ii. Duress and superior orders, though originally linked in Nuremburg trials,
have been separated by the ICTY; the preclusion of one as a defence will not
automatically lead to the rejection of the other.
In the post-World War II military tribunals, a plea of superior orders would be dismissed
without an accompanying plea of duress. However, in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, the ICTY judges
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distinguished between these two defences as autonomous concepts. While it was recognized that
the defence of duress might result from a threat emanating from a superior order in a military
context, the Court recognized that such an order need not be present for duress to exist.
iii. In Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, the leading case on the subject of duress as a
defense under international law, the majority opinion in the Appeals Court
held that duress is not available as an absolute defence for war crimes or
crimes against humanity.
Though Judges McDonald, Vohrah, and Li recognized that some civil law states allow
duress as a defence to murder, they claimed sufficient policy considerations supported the
determination that duress could not be pled as a defence to certain charges under international
law. Due to the gravity of acts which constitute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
genocide, the majority judges concluded that duress should never be allowed as an absolute
defence to these charges.
iv. Both the dissent in Erdemovic and Article 31 of the Rome Statute allow that
duress might be an absolute defence as long as four factors are met: a)
There must be a genuine threat of imminent harm; b) There must be no
adequate means of averting the harm; c) The harm caused must be
proportional to the harm averted – in other words, the harm chosen must be
the “lesser of two evils;” d) The actor cannot have voluntarily brought about
the situation.
Judges Cassese and Stephen rejected the majority’s policy considerations and argued that
general principles of law ought to be observed in absence of customary international law on
duress as a defence. To that end, Judge Cassese proposed four factors that a defendant must meet
in order to successfully plead duress. He recognized, however, that duress could not be an
absolute defence to crimes against humanity because the proportionality requirement could not
be met. The language in Article 31 of the Rome Statute appears to reject the analysis put forth by
the majority in Erdemovic and instead suggests that the first three of these elements of Cassese’s
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four-factor test must be met for a defendant to successfully plead duress. It further instructs that
judges have the authority to determine the applicability of defences on a case-by-case basis.
v. There is general agreement that although duress is not a complete defence,
the actor’s blameworthiness may be lessened due to the circumstances of
duress; the tribunal judges have the duty to decide the weight duress should
have in the determination of mitigation of sentence.
A defendant who commits an act under duress is considered to be less blameworthy than
a defendant who commits an act without such compulsion. Thus, there is ample precedent to
suggest that duress, when not acting as a complete defence for the accused, should be considered
in mitigation of punishment at the judges’ discretion if they find that justice so requires.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The law of major national legal systems is far from uniform on the application of duress
as a defence, being generally divided between civil law and common law rules.1 This division
was recognized in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,2 the leading ICTY case on the subject of the
application of duress as a defence under international law.3 Judges McDonald and Vohrah, who
presented the plurality opinion in the case, recognized this general division in their examination
of duress as a defense in the national criminal law of both common law and civil law systems.4
Judges McDonald and Vohrah examined a number of codes found within civil law
systems5 to reach their determination that the civil law rule “consistently recognize[s] duress as a

1

See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald
and Judge Vohrah, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Oct. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Erdemovic Decision:
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
2
For facts of this case, see infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
3
See Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
4
Id. at ¶ 49 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
5
Civil law systems examined included France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Italy,
Norway, Sweden, Finland, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Chile, Panama, Mexico, and the Former
Yugoslavia.
3
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complete defence to all crimes.”6 The theory behind a rule permitting duress as a complete
defence seems to be “the recognition that there is a point where a person of reasonable firmness
in a situation will be unable to resist the unlawful force” and this has become the test to measure
whether duress exists.7 However, the application of duress as a defence is not always clear.8
Some civil law states, such as China and Japan, apply a proportionality test or balancing
analysis.9 Under such a test, a plea of duress would only be successful only when “the harm
produced by averting the danger to the accused’s life exceeded the harm that was sought to be
avoided.”10 In other words, duress was allowed as a complete defence in these states only where
“preserving the accused’s life was seen as avoiding a greater harm than killing the victims.”11
Judges McDonald and Vohrah then analyzed various common law codes12 and concluded
that duress is generally not a defence to murder in these jurisdictions.13 These judges took
particular notice of the fact that, “while the criminal codes of fourteen civil law jurisdictions
were proffered by the defence as prescribing necessity or duress as a general exculpatory
principle applying to all crimes, common law systems, with the sole exception of the United

6

Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1, at ¶ 59 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
7
Sienho Yee, Towards an International Law of Co-progressiveness 149 (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
8
See Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
9
Valerie Epps, Symposium: The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the Major Rulings of the
International Criminal Tribunal over the Past Decade: The Soldier’s Obligation to Die when
Ordered to Shoot Civilians or Face Death Himself, 37 NEW ENG.L. REV. 987, 1001 (2003)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
10
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
11
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
12
Common law systems examined included England, the United States, Australia, Canada, South
Africa, India, Malaysia, and Nigeria.
13
Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1, at ¶ 70 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
4
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States, categorically reject duress as a defence to murder.”14 This conclusion is based in part on
the holding in Regina v. Howe, an English case in which the Court of Appeal concluded that
duress could not operate as a complete defence to murder or attempted murder.15
In Regina v. Howe, Lord Hailsham, one of the Appeals judges, asserted in his judgment
that “a reasonable man might reflect that one innocent life is at least as valuable as his own or
that of his loved one … [so he] cannot claim that his is choosing the lesser of two evils.”16
Furthermore, he considered it against the dictates of good law, good policy, or good morals to
suggest that “an ordinary man of reasonable fortitude is not supposed to be capable of heroism if
he is asked to take an innocent life rather than sacrifice his own.” 17 It should be noted, however,
that the law, in denying duress as a defence, would not only ask that a man be capable of
heroism; it would demand that an actor act heroically or suffer legal consequences.18
Another judge on the bench in Howe, Lord Bridge, also denied duress as a defence to
murder. In his decision, he rejected the theory that a person acting under duress acts without
volition and thus lacks the mens rea necessary to commit a crime of specific intent.19 While Lord
Bridge did not provide an analysis or explanation for this portion of his decision, legal scholar
and law professor Sienho Yee has suggested in his book Towards an International Law of CoProgressiveness that an actor has a “guilty mind” if he commits an act that he knows to be
Andrew Bowers, A Concession to Humanity in the Killing of Innocents – Validating the
Defences of Duress and Superior Orders in International Law, 15 W.R.L.S.I. 31, 47 (2003)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
15
Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1, at ¶ 60 n.114
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
16
R v. Howe, (1987) A.C. 417 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
17
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
18
Judge Cassese agrees with me that this is a significant distinction. See Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Appeals
Chamber Judgment (Oct. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Erdemovic Decision: Judge Cassese] [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
19
Howe, supra note 16 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
14
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wrong.20 In fact, Professor Yee argues that a choice to take another person’s life in order to save
one’s own could be said to have “a highly deliberative quality.”21 However, he suggests that a
man acting under duress is less blameworthy than a man who kills without constraint and, thus,
the proper result for the less blameworthy man would be a mitigation of punishment.22
As Judges McDonald and Vohrah noted in Erdemovic, however, not all common law
jurisdictions preclude duress as a defence to murder.23 They examined a wide range of common
law systems24 and recognized that “the common law systems throughout the world, with the
exception of a small minority of jurisdictions in the United States … reject duress as a defence to
the killing of innocent persons.”25 The “small minority of jurisdictions in the United States” 26 to
which they refer are those that have implemented Section 2.09 of the Model Penal Code.27 The
American Law Institute, which put forth the Model Penal Code in 1962, stated that law is
ineffectual and hypocritical if it imposes on an actor who is faced with a choice to kill or be
killed a standard that even his judges would not be able to affirm that they would be capable of
upholding in a similar situation.28 “The underlying philosophical rationale of the recognition of
(extreme) duress as a defence is that we cannot expect others to live up to a standard that is so

20

Yee, supra note 7, at 150 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
Id. at 147 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
22
Id. at 148 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
23
Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1, at ¶ 67 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
24
See supra note 11 for a listing of common law jurisdictions.
25
Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1, at ¶ 67 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
26
The judges did not identify the jurisdictions within the United States that they examined to
reach this conclusion.
27
Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1, at ¶ 67 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
28
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 (1985) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
21
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high that we cannot guarantee that we ourselves would uphold it under similar circumstances.”29
The question thus becomes how much one can expect of humanity.30
After analyzing civil law and common law codes on the subject of duress, Judges
McDonald and Vohrah noted that “the rules of the various legal systems in the world are …
largely inconsistent regarding the specific question whether duress affords a complete defence to
a combatant charged with a war crime or a crime against humanity involving the killing of
innocent persons.”31 Finally, the judges recognized that virtually all legal systems were willing to
take duress into account “when determining whether to mitigate punishment or sometimes even
to lessen the offense charged.”32 However, because the specific rules of the various legal systems
analyzed failed to distinguish a consistent rule concerning the use of duress as a complete
defence to murder,33 the analysis of national legal systems “did not resolve the question of
whether an international criminal tribunal should properly treat duress as a complete defence or
only as a mitigating factor.”34
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Precedent of the Nuremberg Trials
The Nuremberg Trials provide persuasive rather than binding authority in the
contemporary application of international criminal law.35 In any case, examination of this

29

Bowers, supra note 14, at 56 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
31
Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1, at ¶ 67 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
32
Epps, supra note 9, at 1001 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
33
See Erdemovic Decision: Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, supra note 1 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
34
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity & Duress, 43 VA. J. INT’L L.
861, 867 (2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
35
Bing Bing Jia, Judicial Decisions as a Source of International Law and the Defence of Duress
in Murder or Other Cases Arising from Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST30
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precedent shows that the jurisprudence on the defence of duress established by the Nuremberg
Trials is far from uniform.36 Since they were the first trials of their kind, there was no guidance
for the judges in seeking to apply international law to the cases before them.37 The Nuremburg
Charter provided no grounds for excluding criminal responsibility,38 and without a clear
international law on the issue, the Nuremburg judges were left to rely upon the laws of their
respective national jurisdictions.39
It is important to note that, although there is a distinction between the terms “duress” and
“necessity” in international criminal law today, these terms were used interchangeably
throughout the Nuremburg trials.40 Furthermore, duress in the form of superior orders took on a
particular importance41 that was greater than that seen in more recent international trials. Claims
of duress connected with superior orders were frequently argued in trials following World War
II,42 and though there was no direct or compulsory relationship between the two, these trials
predicated a claim of superior orders upon a claim of duress. That is, unless there was evidence
that a defendant acted under duress, pleas of superior orders were not admissible.43 “This

COLD WAR WORLD 77, 85 (Sienho Yee & Wang Tieya eds., Routledge 2001) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
36
See E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
20].
37
Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law 44 (Oxford University Press 2001)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
38
Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law para. 402 (T.M.C. Asser Press 2005)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
39
Kittichaisaree, supra note 37, at 44 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
40
Werle, supra note 38, at para. 421 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
41
Id. at para. 424 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
42
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
43
Bowers, supra note 14, at 43 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
8
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position, in effect, [made] superior orders dependent upon conditions of duress in that, without
evidence of the latter, the former [could] have no bearing at all in the proceedings.”44
It seems logical that certain factors necessary to plead a defence of duress could be
identified from the precedent of the Nuremburg Tribunals. However, just as the courts
themselves blurred the distinction between superior orders and duress, scholars have struggled to
determine whether a claim of superior orders was a necessary element to plead duress before the
tribunals.
In his essay on the influence of judicial decisions on the defence of duress, legal scholar
Bing Bing Jia submitted that the defence of duress at Nuremburg consisted of certain criteria. 1)
There had to be an “illegal, superior order, recognized as such by the person to whom the order is
directed.”45 2) This order had to be accompanied by a “present and immediate danger to the life
or body of the recipient of the order or those of his close family, leaving him with no moral
choice but to comply therewith.”46 3) The recipient of the order was to be left with “no will or
intent of his own to act in the way required by the order.”47 This essay does not make clear
whether the identification of these elements arose from Ja’s original analysis or whether they
originated in another source.
On the other hand, Archbold International Criminal Courts Practice, Procedure, and
Evidence does not include superior orders as a necessary element in a plea of duress at
Nuremburg. According to this text, there had to be 1) an “imminent, real, and inevitable” threat

44

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
Jia, supra note 35, at 94 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
46
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
47
Id. at 94-95 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
45
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to “the accused or someone else.”48 2) The accused had to have an honest belief that the threat
would be carried out. This claimed compulsion was to be determined by a subjective standard.49
3) The harm caused had to be proportionate to the harm threatened.50 If the “accused’s will
coincide[d] with those from whom the threat stem[med],”51 a claim of duress would not be
upheld. Finally, 4) the circumstances had to be “such that a reasonable man would apprehend
that he was in such imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to choose the right and
refrain from the wrong.”52 In other words, under both of these formulations, the accused had to
lack a “moral choice” at the time of the act.
In an interpretation of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, ratified in 1945,
the Nuremburg Tribunal said, “The true test of duress, which is found in varying degrees in the
criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in
fact possible.”53 The Nuremburg Trials concluded that duress required that the threat the
defendant faced be such that he was left with no moral choice but to act. Moral pressure alone
would not be sufficient; the danger had to be life-threatening.54
This “moral choice” standard came to be known as the “Nuremburg Defence.”55 “Moral
choice” depended upon a person’s moral perception of possible alternative courses of action in
an abnormal situation.56 At a moment when a person is faced with the real threat of imminent

48

Archbold International Criminal Courts Practice, Procedure and Evidence §17-57 (Sweet &
Maxwell 2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
49
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
50
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
51
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
52
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
53
Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity 181 (Cambridge University Press 2005) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
54
van Sliedregt, supra note 36, at 281 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
55
May, supra note 53, at 181 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
56
Id. at 186 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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death, where “moral perception becomes motivationally important, … one may feel that one has
alternatives but not perceive any of them to be acceptable given what one perceives to be salient
in the situation at hand.”57 A lack of moral choice could therefore provide a defence for even the
most manifestly illegal of orders58 on the theory that people should be held criminally
responsible only where a choice is possible or where they were able to understand the wrongness
of their acts and contributed to the harm.59
Duress was pled in front of the Post World War Two tribunals with mixed results.
Though the American Military Tribunals recognized that duress could be a defence in theory,
they seldom found that the requirements for this defence existed in practice.60 In U.S. v.
Ohlendorf et al. (the Einsatzgruppen case),61 the defendant was found guilty and executed for his
role as the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe D, one of the German Army’s four mobile killing
squads.62 Ohlendorf was responsible for the deaths of an estimated 90,000 people between June
1941 and March 1942.63
At Ohlendorf trial, the U.S. Military Tribunal recognized limits on the application of
duress and denied the defence of duress.64 Although the Court recognized that “[n]o court will
punish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his head, is compelled to pull a lethal lever,”65 it also

57

Id. at 191 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in
International Law 123 (Oxford University Press 1997) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 18].
59
May, supra note 53, at 182 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
60
Werle, supra note 38, at para. 424 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
61
An original copy of the trial transcript could not be located at the time of this writing.
62
Norman Goda, Report on the Otto Ohlendorf IRR File, THE U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND
RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, http://www.archives.gov/iwg/research-papers/ohlendorf-irrfile.html#note3 (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
63
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
64
See van Sliedregt, supra note 36, at 282 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
65
Jia, supra note 35, at 88 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
58
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found that duress could never be a defence in the mass killings of innocent civilians66 in a case
where the “will of the doer merges with the will of the superior in the execution of the illegal
act.”67
British Military Courts were also divided on the issue of duress as a defence. In the trial
of Valentin Fuerstien et al.,68 the Court rejected the defence of duress, saying, “[n]ow the
defence of ‘duress and coercion’ is not a defence in law. You are not entitled, even if you wish to
save your own life, to take the life of another.”69 Conversely, the Judge Advocate in the British
Military Court trial of Gustav Jepsen et al.70 advised the Court that duress could seldom be pled
as a defence and stressed that the threat had to be of a degree be “far, far greater” than the harm
that would result if the order were obeyed.71
B. The ICTY Statute and the Erdemovic Decision
The Statute of the International Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia does not address
permissible defences for the accused.72 However, Paragraph 58 of the Report of the SecretaryGeneral, which embodies the intent of the drafters of the ICTY Statute, provides some guidance
on this issue. It states, “The International Tribunal itself will have to decide on various personal
defences which may relieve a person of individual responsibility … drawing upon general
principles of law recognized by all nations.”73 Examples enumerated in this paragraph include

66

van Sliedregt, supra note 36, at 282 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
Jia, supra note 35, at 88 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
68
An original copy of the trial transcript could not be located at the time of this writing.
69
Jia, supra note 35, at 91 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
70
An original copy of the trial transcript could not be located at the time of this writing.
71
Jia, supra note 35, at 91 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
72
See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tabs 11].
73
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 para. 58 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Report of the
Secretary-General] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
67
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“minimum age or mental capacity,”74 but this list is illustrative rather than exhaustive.
Therefore, if a defence is available under general principles of law recognized by all nations, it
appears as if it is available under the ICTY Statute.75
Furthermore, nothing in the ICTY Statute specifies whether a connection between
superior orders and duress was intended to continue to exist as it had in the Nuremburg Trials.
Paragraph 57 of the Report of the Secretary-General denies a plea of superior orders as a defence
but says that “[o]bedience to superior orders may, however, be considered a mitigating factor,
should the International Tribunal determine that justice so requires.” 76 The Tribunal could
therefore consider the existence of a superior order in connection with another defence, such as
duress.77
The language of Paragraph 57 seems to recognize that a defence of coercion could exist
separate from one of superior orders, though the presence of a superior order may constitute
some evidence of coercion.78 This appears to be a logical conclusion if one remembers that
duress generally encompasses “any threat to life or limb, regardless of whether or not it emanates
from a superior order in a military context – it is the nature of the threat itself that is of focal
concern.”79 In fact, Professor Yee argues that to preclude a defence of duress separate from a
claim of superior orders would lead to an absurd result: a defendant would be relieved of

74

Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
See id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]; Yee, supra note 7, at 139
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
76
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808,
supra note 73, at para. 57 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
77
Id. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
78
See id. at para. 57 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]; Yee, supra note 7, at 139
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
79
Bowers, supra note 14, at 46 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
75
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criminal responsibility if he committed a crime when threatened by a subordinate or peer but not
if the threat came from a superior.80
The distinction between superior orders and duress has been recognized elsewhere. The
distinction was recognized in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, in which Judge Cassese concluded that
duress was an autonomous concept from superior orders.81 Thus, “preclusion of reliance upon
the former does not in any way simultaneously preclude reliance upon the latter,” 82 provided a
threat to the life of the accused accompanied the superior order.
While it is clear that the ICTY may “draw[] upon general principles of law recognized by
all nations,”83 it is unclear whether such a general principle of law exists on the subject of duress
as a defence to murder.84
In summary, although the Report of the Secretary-General dictates that the ICTY can
draw upon “general principles of law” recognized by all nations in determining whether a
particular defence should be allowed, no such general principle has been clearly established on
the subject of duress.
i. The Trial Chamber denied duress as a complete defence in Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic.
Analysis of the general principles of law regarding duress was conducted by the Appeals
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic. It should be noted that Erdemovic was “the first person
sentenced by the ICTY and the first sentenced by an international war crimes tribunal since the
Nuremburg … trials after World War II. As a result, [this] Sentencing Judgment is a milestone
80

Yee, supra note 7, at 141 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
Erdemovic Decision: Judge Cassese, supra note 18, at ¶ 15 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 5].
82
Bowers, supra note 14, at 45 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
83
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 73, at para. 58 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 12].
84
Yee, supra note 7, at 147 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
81
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for the ICTY.”85 A brief review of the facts in this case is helpful to understand the holding in
this case as it impacts the defence of duress in international law.
On or about July 16, 1995, Drazen Erdemovic, along with the other members of his
Bosnian Serb military unit, was ordered to a farm near the town of Pilica.86 Throughout the day,
busloads of Muslim men, ranging in age from 17 to 60, arrived at the farm, where they were
unloaded from the busses in groups of ten and made to stand in a line with their backs to
Erdemovic and the other soldiers.87 A superior ordered the soldiers to kill the civilians.88
Erdemovic claimed he initially refused but was told that he could either follow orders or elect to
die with the captives.89 In fear of this threat, he admitted that he capitulated and participated in
the deaths of at least 70 people, for which the ICTY Trial Chamber eventually sentenced him to
10 years imprisonment.90
The Trial Chamber considered the defences Erdemovic raised to be the defence of
“obedience to superior orders” and the defence of “physical and moral duress accompanied by
the order from a military superior” and rejected them both.91 In doing so, the Trial Court referred
to the ICTY Statute and the Report of the Secretary General and found that paragraph 57 of the
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Secretary General’s report seemed to regard duress as at most a mitigating circumstance.92 The
pertinent language of the paragraph in question, however, reads, “Obedience to superior orders
may … be considered a mitigating factor, should the International Tribunal determine that justice
so requires.” 93 Furthermore, paragraph 58 directs that “[t]he International Tribunal itself will
have to decide on various personal defences which may relieve a person of individual criminal
responsibility, such as minimum age or mental incapacity, drawing upon general principles of
law recognized by all nations.”94
The Trial Court concluded that, although neither the Secretary General’s Report nor the
ICTY Statute provided for the defence of duress, duress could be considered a complete defence
for violations of international humanitarian law.95 However, the defence of duress was rejected
in Erdemovic’s case due to lack of corroboration of the claims made by the accused.96 In making
this determination, the Court made it clear that, when the crime charged was a crime against
humanity, the life of the accused could not be considered equivalent to that of his victim.97 This
is due to the determination that, unlike in the typical case of murder, “the violation … is no
longer directed at the physical welfare of the victim alone but at humanity as a whole.”98
In addition to these considerations, the Trial Court recognized that, under very limited
circumstances, the International Military Tribunals at Nuremburg and other similar courts have
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permitted necessity and duress to exclude an actor’s criminal responsibility.99 In other cases,
necessity and duress were merely considered to be “element[s] for mitigation of the sentence.”100
Because of these considerations and the language of the Report of the Secretary General,
the Erdemovic Trial Chamber decided that duress could be only a mitigating factor at best, but it
also required evidence of the superior order that was claimed to have placed such pressure on the
accused that he was left with an “absence of moral choice.”101 Questions to be addressed relating
to “urgent necessity stemming from duress and a superior order”102 were as follows:
1) Could the accused have avoided the situation in which he found himself?
2) Was the accused confronted with an insurmountable order which he had no way to
circumvent?
3) Was the accused, or one of his immediate family members, placed in danger of
immediate death or death shortly afterwards?
4) Did the accused possess the moral choice to oppose the orders he had received? Had
he possessed that freedom, would he have attempted to oppose the orders?103
The Appeals Chamber rejected the Trial Chamber’s finding on duress as a defence by a
3-2 majority, finding it “deficient because it misconstrue[d] the interplay between superior orders
and duress.”104 The decision made by the Trial Court seemed to make the defence of duress
dependent upon evidence of a superior order, which is the “exact opposite formulation to that
advocated in Einsatzgruppen wherein a claim of superior orders is dependent upon evidence of
duress.”105
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ii. The Appeals Chamber decision was divided on the issue of the availability of
duress as a complete defence to a defendant who has been charged with the
murder of innocent civilians.
In its analysis, the Erdemovic Appeals Chamber recognized that no clear legal standard
had previously been set with respect to the scope of duress as a defence in international law.106
Therefore, the majority looked to state practice for guidance on the application of the defence of
duress.107 In justification of this examination of the legal concepts of national legal systems, the
Appeals Chamber noted that such reliance “is justified when international rules make explicit
reference to national laws or where such reference is necessarily implied by the very content and
nature of the concept.”108
The analysis put forth by the Appeals Chamber noted the aforementioned division
between civil law and common law jurisdictions.109 In light of this analysis, the judges in the
Appeals Chamber acknowledged the ambiguity of the precise scope of the duress defence under
international law.110 They declared that there existed no useful “general principle of law
recognized by civilized nations that could be extrapolated from state practice,”111 and that thus,
“no rule may be found in customary international law regarding the availability or the nonavailability of duress as a defence to the charge of killing innocent human beings.”112 Therefore,
the Appeals Chamber considered the issue a matter of first impression and attempted to
106
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determine the appropriate rule relating to the scope of this defence in the context of international
law.113
a. The majority opinion denied duress as a complete defence to charges of
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, though they held that
duress could operate as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
The majority opinion of the Appeals Chamber was signed by Judges McDonald, Vohrah,
and Lee, who ultimately decided to apply the common law rule.114 Judges McDonald and Vohrah
recognized the International Law Commission’s concession that different views existed as to
whether or not a valid defence could arise from even the most extreme duress with respect to
such heinous crimes as the murder of innocent human beings.115 They also recognized that the
post World War II military tribunals of nine nations accepted duress as a complete defence.116
However, while they decided that duress might have mitigating weight at sentencing, they also
found that duress could not act as a complete defense to a soldier charged with a war crime or a
crime against humanity involving the murder of innocent civilians.117 Duress was excluded as a
complete defence to war crimes and crimes against humanity because of the magnitude of the
crimes in question; no matter the magnitude of the duress, no amount of duress could lead to full
exoneration.118
In his article, “Duress in International Humanitarian Law,” former ICTY Judge
Mohamed Shahabuddeen recognizes that the ICTY Statute, when considered in light of the
Report of the Secretary General, specifies two sources of law for the Tribunal to apply, namely
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general principles of law and customary international law.119 “An essential principle on which
the Tribunal was constructed by the Security Council was that its mandate would be restricted to
customary international law, all States being bound by this.”120 Therefore, in its adoption of the
ICTY Statute, the Security Council could have applied any reasonable doctrine on the defence of
duress.121
The United Nations Security Council had not identified a doctrine on duress to be applied
by the Court. 122 Furthermore, neither general principles of law nor customary international law
provided guidance on the issue of whether duress was a complete defence to the charge of
murder. 123 Judge Shahabuddeen explained that it was for these reasons that the Judges
McDonald and Vohrah turned its attention to other considerations.124
Judges McDonald, Vohrah, and Li considered the fact that the Tribunal had purview over
“the most heinous crimes known to humankind” to be a critical factor in their analysis.125 They
also noted that “the protection of the weak and vulnerable in such a situation where their lives
and security are endangered” was a main objective of international humanitarian law.126
Judges McDonald and Vohrah recognized that, unlike national criminal codes and
national courts, Tribunals such as the ICTY were faced with crimes “committed in armed
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conflicts of extreme violence with egregious dimensions.”127 Because national law lacked a
consistent rule concerning the exculpatory effect of duress as a defence, the Judges examined the
crimes over which the Tribunal exercised mandate, the contexts of the Tribunal’s creation, and
the Tribunal’s “mandate in the Statute … in relation to serious violations of international
humanitarian law.”128 As crimes against humanity and war crimes could be considered to be
distinct from the types of crimes facing national courts, McDonald and Vohrah did not consider
these national standards to be useful as a guide for the crimes facing the Tribunal.129 Instead,
they agreed with the Trial Court’s assertion that a crime against humanity, such as the murders
committed by Erdemovic, victimizes not just those killed but humanity as a whole.130 In other
words, although duress could be a defence to murder under some states’ national criminal laws,
the judges found that it did not necessarily follow that it should be a defence to mass murder of
innocent civilians. Therefore, they decided that a defendant should not be allowed to plead
duress to a war crime or crime against humanity, although he might be able to plead duress to a
discrete act of murder.131
Judge Li agreed with Judges McDonald and Vohrah that duress could not be a complete
defence for the most heinous of crimes.132 He examined the precedent of the post-World War II
military tribunals and concluded that duress could be a complete defence to most crimes,
provided certain requirements were met: 1) The act was committed to prevent a serious and
127
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irreparable immediate harm; 2) No other adequate means of escape were available; and 3) the act
committed was not disproportionate to the evil threatened.133 However, he rejected the plea in the
case before him because “the act charged was heinous and international humanitarian law is
quintessentially concerned with the protection of innocent civilians.”134
By excluding crimes against humanity from the defence of duress, the majority declared
“an absolute moral postulate which is clear and unmistakable for the implementation of
international humanitarian law.”135 A soldier can never be excused for killing innocent civilians,
even if his refusal would have cost him his own life and even if his death would not have
prevented the civilians from being murdered regardless.136 Underlying this position is the
“maxim that it can never be right to kill an innocent human being because the contrary rule
would violate the ‘special sanctity that law attaches to human life.’ Consequently, no one should
have a legal right to choose one innocent person be killed instead of another.”137
In their analysis, Judges McDonald and Vohrah focused on the protective responsibility
soldiers should extend to unarmed civilians in the “rubric of international humanitarian law
governing the conduct of armed hostilities.” 138 On that basis, they refused to apply a test that
would analyze what an ordinary person in circumstances similar to Erdemovic’s would do.139
Because they read a protective role into a soldier’s duties, they denied the plea of duress as a
complete defence to soldiers charged with the particularly heinous crimes of war crimes or
133
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crimes against humanity.140 Judge Li concurred, recognizing that duress could not provide a
complete defence but should only be grounds for mitigation of punishment under these
circumstances.141
Judges McDonald and Vohrah further noted that soldiers “are expected to exercise
fortitude and a greater degree of resistance to a threat than civilians, at least when it is their own
lives which are being threatened.”142 They questioned what one could expect of an ordinary
soldier who, “by the very nature of [his] occupation, must have envisaged the possibility of
violent death in pursuance of the cause for which [he] fight[s].”143 Thus, they concluded that,
given that death is a known occupational hazard for those involved in combat, duress is
unacceptable as an excuse for a soldier who is faced with the choice between his own death and
the killing of innocent civilians.144 Rather, “suffering death [should be] the unwavering rule for
the soldier rather than killing civilians, regardless of whether the soldier’s death will save the
civilians.”145
Other concerns dealt with the effectiveness and development of international
humanitarian law.146 Judges McDonald and Vohrah recognized that the International Tribunal
was established expressly “as a measure to ‘halt and effectively redress’ the widespread and
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flagrant violations of international humanitarian law … and to contribute thereby to the
restoration and maintenance of peace.” 147 Therefore, “in accordance with the spirit of
international humanitarian law,” the judges concluded that duress could not be admitted as a
complete defence to the murder of innocent civilians.148
Furthermore, Judges McDonald and Vohrah had concerns that if duress were allowed in
cases where innocent civilians were murdered, it would in essence assist the superior in his
criminal act and encourage the actor to kill with impunity.149 The majority judges’ decision to
base their ruling on these considerations has been roundly criticized by the dissent.150 The
dissenting judges’ opinion will be further discussed below. 151
In paragraph 66 of the Joint Opinion, the majority acknowledged a general principle of
law recognized by civilized nations that crimes committed under duress were less blameworthy
and less deserving of punishment than crimes committed without any duress or coercion.152 It
should be noted that “[b]eing ‘less blameworthy’ means that the accused is blameworthy
notwithstanding that he acted under duress but that his having acted under duress diminishes the
nature of his blameworthiness.”153 Though full punishment may not be appropriate for a person
who acts under circumstances of duress, by implication, some punishment is still deserved.154 It
is unclear how much of an impact the majority judges intended duress to have in mitigation of
punishment.
147
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a. The dissenting judges argued that duress should operate as a complete
defence to all crimes, provided certain elements were met.
Judges Cassese and Stephen, dissenting from the majority opinion, rejected the majority’s
analysis of outside considerations as unrelated to the Tribunal’s purpose.155 Rather, they asserted
that the task of the Tribunal was not to set legal policy but simply to interpret and apply a legal
provision and procedural right.156 Judge Cassese stated that the Tribunal, as a court of law,
should refrain from metalegal analyses and concentrate on the law itself. 157 “A policy-oriented
approach…runs contrary to the fundamental customary principle nullum crimen sine lege [no
punishment without a law authorizing it].”158 Furthermore, he advocated that the court apply lex
lata, or “existing rules of international law as they are created through the sources of the
international legal system” as found in post-WWII war crimes trials, and concluded that the
court’s analysis of policy considerations was acting ultra vires.159
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion that duress could be considered only as a mitigating
factor at sentencing, the dissent advocated for the use of duress as a complete defence.160 In fact,
Judge Cassese stressed that it was important to remember that the purpose of national or
international criminal law was to punish criminal behavior.161 He further argued that a
conviction, regardless of mitigation, would indicate that the court considered the accused’s act to
155
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be a criminal one and that the defendant should have behaved differently. 162 The disagreement
between the majority and dissenting opinions seems to concern whether duress should be denied
as a matter of law or whether a court should, in a fact-specific inquiry, have the authority to deny
duress as a defence unless certain requisite conditions are met.163 In other words, though the
majority opinion was willing to reject the defence of duress outright, the dissent was willing to
“distinguish levels of duress, and while dismissing some levels of duress as not giving rise to a
defence would, nevertheless, preserve the defence of duress in the context of superior orders to
commit a manifestly illegal order, provided certain stringent conditions were met.”164
Like the majority, the dissent recognized that no customary international law had been
established on the subject.165 Judge Stephen thus looked to “general principle[s] of law
recognized by civilized nations” and acknowledged both the civil law jurisprudence on the
acceptance of duress as a defence and the general rejection of duress as a defence in common
law.166 He attributed the latter to an idea that a person under duress ought to take his own life
rather than kill an innocent human being when faced with such a choice, but he concluded that
this rationale was not sufficient when the victims would have died, regardless of the accused’s
behavior. 167
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Based on these findings, Stephen concluded that it was irrational to deny duress as a
complete defence but allow duress to factor into mitigation of punishment.168 Thus, though he
shared the concerns expressed by Judges McDonald and Vohrah regarding the need to protect
innocent lives in times of armed conflict, he decided that “[this] aim is not achieved by the denial
of a just defence to one who is in no position to effect by his own will the protection of innocent
life.”169
Judge Cassese focused on two areas in which he disagreed with the majority – “the
question of whether international criminal law upholds the common-law approach to duress in
case of killing,” and “the extent to which international criminal courts can rely on national
laws.”170 He acknowledged the non-existence of a specific international law on the subject of
duress and argued that the court should have applied the general rule on this subject – namely
that duress could operate as a complete defence to all crimes, including murder, provided certain
circumstances were met.171 It should be noted that he distinguished duress, which involves
threats by a third party, from the broader concept of necessity, which can involve threats from
outside causes, such as lack of food.172
Finally, Cassese concluded that four requisite conditions existed in order for a claim of
duress to be met. 1) The defendant’s act had to be committed under an immediate threat of
serious harm.173 2) The defendant must have been faced with no adequate means of avoiding the
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threat.174 3) The harm caused must not have been disproportionate to the harm threatened; in
other words, it must be the lesser of two evils.175 Cassese acknowledged that the proportionality
requirement could never be satisfied where the defendant had chosen to take an innocent
person’s life in order to save his own because the evil caused is at least equal to the evil
threatened.176 Thus, duress could arguably never be a defence to murder. 4) The defendant could
not have voluntarily brought about the situation leading to the duress.177 In explaining the
importance of this element, Cassese argued that a person who freely chose to become a member
of an organization that acted contrary to the purposes of international humanitarian law should
not be allowed to later excuse himself from criminal liability by claiming duress.178 He also
declared that the defence would not be available to an accused who had some special protective
duty towards the victim, but he did not elaborate on this point.179 Rather, he argued that the
prosecution should be faced with proving beyond a reasonable doubt only that, at the time the
accused joined the armed forces, he or she was personally aware that those forces were
committing breaches of international humanitarian law and that, with this knowledge, he or she
willingly joined anyway.180
Judge Cassese argued that, if all four of the above listed elements are met,181 duress
should be a defence to all crimes, including crimes against humanity and suggested that the
majority’s ruling set the standard of expected behavior unacceptably high in requiring acts of
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heroism by ordinary people.182 “Law is based on what society can reasonably expect of its
members. It should not set intractable standards of behavior which require mankind to perform
acts of martyrdom, and brand as criminal any behaviour falling below those standards.”183
The dissent also argued that duress should be allowed as a complete defense in
circumstances where the victims’ deaths could not be averted by the sacrifice of the actor’s
life.184 In such circumstances, Cassese’s third element – the balancing or proportionality
argument – would either be circumvented or simply not applied.185 Cassese argued that the law
cannot require an ordinary man to set a heroic example.186 Judge Stephen agreed, adding that the
denial of a defence to a person who cannot protect innocent lives by effect of his will does not
achieve the protection of innocent lives in armed conflicts.187 Therefore, in situations in which
the sacrifice of the actor’s life would not save innocent lives, Cassese would extend the defence
of duress to an actor who chose not to make that sacrifice.188
If duress is proven, the dissenting judges considered mitigation of punishment – even the
possibility of no punishment – as insufficient.189 Explaining this argument, Cassese explained

182

Erdemovic Decision: Judge Cassese, supra note 18, at ¶¶ 12, 47 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 5].
183
Id. at ¶ 47 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
184
Id. at ¶ 44 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
185
van Sliedregt, supra note 36, at 288 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
186
Erdemovic Decision: Judge Cassese, supra note 18, at ¶ 44 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 5].
187
Erdemovic Decision: Judge Stephen, supra note 166, at ¶ 65 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 7].
188
Erdemovic Decision: Judge Cassese, supra note 18, at ¶ 44 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 5].
189
Id. at ¶ 48 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5]; Erdemovic Decision: Judge
Stephen, supra note 166, at ¶ 27 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
29

Josephina S.R. Manifold
International War Crimes Research Lab
Fall 2008
that a conviction, even with a mitigation of punishment, would brand the defendant’s act as
criminal, whereas the acceptance of duress as a complete defense would lead to acquittal.190
In response to the analyses put forth by the majority and dissenting opinions, it should be
noted that Professor Yee has criticized these opinions for neglecting to analyze the special
characteristic of a crime against humanity.191 A crime against humanity a specific intent crime,
and this intent is negated by duress.192 If one accepts the proposition that duress negates the
specific intent required to prove a crime against humanity, then duress must be recognized as a
complete defence to a crime against humanity where the underlying crime in question is murder,
even if on a grand scale.193
C. Other Decisions Before the ICTY
Following the Erdemovic case, there have been other cases in which ICTY has
considered and rejected a defence of duress. In Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, the Trial Court
denied that the defence of duress was applicable because the accused denied that his superiors
had caused him such duress that he was compelled to commit the crimes for which he was
charged.194 The facts are as follows: Miroslav Bralo had been a prisoner at Kaonik prison, but he
was released on the condition that he participate in the ethnic cleansing of the town of Ahmici.195
During this attack, Bralo set fire to numerous homes owned by Muslim inhabitants of the town;
planted explosives to destroy a mosque in the area; and captured, interrogated, and killed a
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man.196 While the Trial Court recognized that Bralo had been under some pressure to join the
“Jokers,” the group that had perpetrated this attack, they noted that there was no evidence that he
had attempted to resist.197 In fact, the accused acknowledged that his actions had been wrong and
accepted full responsibility.198 Furthermore, when he later chose to retire from combat, there was
no evidence that he suffered any negative consequences and, thus, it was argued that he could
have – and should have – refused to participate in the activities in Ahmici.199
After Bralo submitted a guilty plea, the Defense argued that mitigation of sentence was
appropriate in this case.200 In support of this argument, the Defense claimed that Bralo had been
“used” by his superiors.201 In light of this argument, the Appeals Chamber analyzed the
applicability of duress as a mitigating factor in Bralo’s sentencing, though the defendant had not
raised this defence at trial. Under the circumstances enumerated above, the court denied that
duress would have been applicable in the defendant’s case, either as a complete defence or as a
mitigation of punishment.202
In Prosecutor v. Darko Mrdja, the court denied duress as a complete defence or a
mitigation of sentence due to a determination that the accused had failed to show that he would
have suffered serious consequences, had he defied the orders of his superiors.203 The accused
acknowledged that in his official capacity as a member of the Prijedor Police “Intervention
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Squad” he had participated in the deaths of at least 200 men.204 He escorted convoys of non-Serb
or Muslim civilians from Tukovi and the Trnopolje camp in Prijedor to a location on the road
along the Ilomsa River, between Skender Vakuf and Mt. Vlasic.205 At this location, members of
the Intervention Squad, including Mrdja, separated military-aged men from the rest of the
convoy with the knowledge and expectation that the men selected would be murdered.206 Mrdja
and the rest of his Squad then loaded the chosen men onto buses which were driven to
Koricanske Stijene, where the men were unloaded, escorted to the side of a deep ravine, ordered
to knee, and then killed.207 Along with the members of his Squad Mrdja personally participated
directly in the unloading, escorting, guarding, and shooting of these captive civilians; only
twelve men survived the massacre.208
At his trial, the defendant claimed that he would have suffered “serious consequences”
and might even have been killed if he had refused to follow orders.209 However, the Trial
Chamber denied the duress defence, finding that “[t]he absence of any convincing evidence of
any meaningful sign that Darko Mrdja wanted to dissociate himself from the massacre at the
time of its commission prevents the Trial Chamber from accepting duress as a mitigating
circumstance.”210
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D. Duress under the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute has codified the defence of duress.211 The language of Article 3(1)(d)
of the ICC Statute seems to reflect the four-factor test proposed by Judge Cassese in his
dissenting opinion in Erdemovic. 212 According to Article 3(1)(d), criminal responsibility will be
excluded when the conduct in question “has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of
imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another
person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid the threat, provided that the
person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.”213 Thus,
though the ICC has yet to be presented with a plea of duress, the Court may ultimately find that
duress can never be a defence to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide since it is
unlikely that this proportionality requirement could be met under such charges.
However, legal Scholar Andrew bowers points out that an analysis of the accused’s
subjective intent is suggested by the use of the word “intend” in Article 3(1)(d). That is, even for
an accused charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity, duress may be an available
defence if it is shown that the accused subjectively intended not to have caused greater harm than
he sought to avoid, regardless of whether the accused objectively avoided committing the greater
harm.214
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The Rome Statute further clarifies that the relevant threat may come from another person
or from circumstances outside the actor’s control.215 However, while the Statute does not list any
offenses that should be excluded from the duress defence, Article 31(2) instructs that “[t]he
Court shall determine the applicability of the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
provided for in this Statute to the case before it,”216 and Article 21 asserts that the Court will be
bound by international law.217 Therefore, it is possible that the court could follow the precedent
set by the ICTY in refusing the defence of duress to charges of murder, though it could still
allow it as a defence to lesser charges or consider it in mitigation of punishment.218
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As of today, there is no clearly established customary international law on the subject of
duress as a complete defence to murder, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide. Thus,
it has been left to judges in international tribunals to look to general principles of law in
determining the applicability of duress in international law.
A survey of post-World War II military tribunals shows that duress was once considered
to exist in conjunction to superior orders; the latter could not be claimed without a
contemporaneous plea of the former. However, the judges in the ICTY recognized these two
concepts to be autonomous and held that the two defences could exist and be pled separately.
In the milestone Prosecutor v. Erdemovic judgment, the majority looked to national law
to determine the existence of a general principle of law on duress. Finding conflicting rules on
the subject, the judges turned to other considerations, including the gravity of the offenses
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charged in international tribunals as well as the interests of international humanitarian law, and
concluded that duress could never operate as a complete defence to crimes against humanity, war
crimes, or genocide. The dissent rejected this approach and argued for a four-factored test that a
defendant must meet in order to successfully plead duress, which should be allowed as a defence
to any crime. However, the dissent agreed that duress would never be successfully pled if the
harm caused is by its nature disproportionate to the harm threatened.
Duress is codified as a defence under the Rome Statute. The language found in Article
31(1)(d) appears to suggest a three-factored test – similar to the test put forth by Judge Cassese
in Erdemovic – for the application of a duress defence. However, Article 31(2) instructs that the
international tribunal judges have the responsibility to determine the applicability of a defence on
a case-by-case basis. Thus, although duress is codified within the Statute, it is possible that the
Court could agree with the precedent put forth by the ICTY and exclude the defence of duress
for certain particularly heinous crimes.
Finally, it should be recognized that courts which exclude duress as an absolute defence
often take the presence of duress into consideration in mitigation of punishment. Still, as no
particular rule or formulation exists to determine the weight such a claim should have on
sentencing, it is up to the judges to apply duress as a mitigating factor as justice so requires.
In summary, there is no clearly established customary international law on duress as a
complete or partial defence, and considerable debate continues on various aspects of the subject;
but over time, international courts have considered duress in mitigation of sentence on a case-bycase basis.
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